A Russellian theory of (definite) descriptions takes an utterance of the form 'The F is G' to express a purely general proposition that affirms the existence of a (contextually) unique F: there is exactly one F [which is C] and it is G. Strawson, by contrast, takes the utterer to presuppose in some sense that there is exactly one salient F, but this is not part of what is asserted; rather, when the presupposition is not met, the utterance simply fails to express a (true or false) proposition. A defender of Strawson's approach, however, must square up to what appear to be straightforward counterexamples to the presupposition thesis, and must also provide an account of certain linguistic phenomena that supposedly demand treating descriptions as quantifiers, as the Russellian theory does. In this paper I propose fresh considerations in favour of Strawson's approach. I shift attention from what the utterer presupposes to preconditions for the use of descriptions, and distinguish between referring and predicative uses of descriptions (not to be confused with referential and attributive uses); importantly, the referring and predicative uses have different preconditions, I argue, and these provide some satisfactory responses to the aforementioned challenges facing the Strawsonian.
Strawson's classic paper 'On Referring' presents a number of objections to Russell's (1905) theory of descriptions (RTD) and provides the basis for an alternative account that treats (definite) descriptions as referring expressions, rather than quantifier expressions as RTD has it. The paper has led supporters of RTD, including Russell himself, to (a) distinguish clearly between sentences and particular uses or utterances of them-and, correspondingly, between sentence-meaning and utterance-meaning-and (b) take the context in which a description sentence is uttered to contribute to the literal content of the utterance. But, that is pretty much the extent of the concessions Strawson has forced from them; Russellians take their central claim, that utterances of description sentences express purely general (quantificational) propositions, to be quite secure after these refinements.
In this paper, I provide fresh considerations against RTD and in support of a Strawsonian account. The latter maintains there are preconditions for expressing propositions with description sentences-echoing Strawson's presupposition thesis (to be outlined shortly)-but distinguishes between referring and predicative uses of descriptions, taking them to involve different preconditions. Recognizing the two uses and their divergent preconditions yields possible explanations of phenomena that are generally invoked by Russellians in support of their approach. Thus, this updated Strawsonian theory should be a more credible and attractive rival to RTD than its predecessor.
Strawson's 'empty-descriptions' objection and presupposition thesis
Let's begin with an outline of Strawson's original case for a 'presuppositional' account. To avoid extraneous worries, let us follow contemporary Russellians and take RTD as maintaining that an utterance of a description sentence, 'The F is G', affirms a proposition of the form: there is exactly one F (which is C) and it is G.
One of Strawson's objections to RTD is that if someone were to sincerely utter (K) The King of France is wise.
today, albeit on the basis of mistaken beliefs, we-ordinary speakers-would be disinclined to proclaim the utterance (call it k) true but would also be disinclined to proclaim it false. This conflicts with RTD in so far as RTD delivers a clear verdict: k is false, for there is at present no king of France. Strawson goes on to offer an explanation of our disinclinations here:
Strawson's Presupposition Thesis (SPT)
A sincere utterer of a description sentence, 'The F is G', presupposes that there is a unique F, but this is not part of what the speaker asserts by way of the utterance (i.e. it is not part of the literal content of the utterance). A special feature of presupposition (in this sense) is that when what is presupposed by an utterer does not obtain, as in the present example, the utterer fails to make a true or a false assertion: the question of truth or falsity does not even arise. 2 However, while SPT has spurred and shaped linguists' study of the phenomenon of presupposition, few philosophers have been persuaded by Strawson's diagnosis.
3 2 The term 'presupposition' is only introduced in this context by Strawson (1964) , where he refines the thesis to take the topic of discourse into account. But his original thesis will do as a springboard for the present discussion. In what follows, I sometimes talk of utterances presupposing such-and-such and at other times of speakers presupposing such-and-such. This laxity should make no difference to the central points I make.
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My primary aim here is to give fresh impetus to Strawson's presuppositional approach; but I also believe the empty-descriptions objection has more going for it than is generally credited; so, before embarking on the main project, here is a brief bid to explicate the real challenge Strawson's example poses to RTD. Consider Russell's rejoinder to Strawson's objection (Russell 1959, p. 179) . Russell protests that what we take the word 'false' to mean is 'a mere question of verbal convenience'. He (Russell) takes it to mean 'not true'-so if k is not true, it is false; whereas Strawson, Russell implicitly complains, does not specify how he understands the term. 4 This response misses the real threat however, for the challenge to RTD does not actually depend on whether we decide to call k 'false' or not.
5 It does seem, as Strawson observes, and as Russell is apparently prepared to concede, that ordinary speakers would generally be disinclined to ascribe a truth value to k as things stand. By RTD, something like (K*) expresses the content of k:
(K*) There is exactly one King of France (who is such-and-such) and he is wise.
Ordinary speakers would not hesitate to proclaim (K*) false.
6 So, what Russellians owe is an explanation of this disparity between k and its candidate Russellian paraphrases.
It is not obvious how an adequate explanation would go. Consider e.g. Sainsbury's (1979) attempt to protect RTD:
[…] the disinclination [to say 'That's false' when confronted with k] in itself establishes no conflict, for perhaps it issues from the realization that to utter 'That's false' in such a situation would be misleading. The reason is that the typical way in which a description sentence 'The F is G' is false is that there is exactly one F but not one which is G. Hence someone who receives the response 'That's false' to his utterance of a description sentence is likely to jump to the conclusion, if he has confidence in his audience, that there is exactly one F but one which is not G. Since his audience realizes all this, he will not be inclined to respond by 'That's false', despite thinking that had he uttered this he would have spoken truly, though misleadingly. (p. 118) Bezuidenhout (2004) , and a special issue of Mind (vol. 114, 2005) commemorating the centenary of 'On Denoting', although critical of RTD in some cases, give little weight to the idea of presupposition-the articles by von Fintel and Atlas, respectively, in the Reimer and Bezuidenhout collection are notable exceptions. 4 Dummett (1978, Essay 2 and Preface: p. xii ff.) makes essentially the same complaint.
In short, the explanation floated here-echoing Grice's (1970) conclusion-is that we are disinclined to say k is false largely because we are disinclined to mislead the utterer of k. But this explanation is inadequate, for two reasons. Firstly, it assumes that we do (or would) consider k to be definitely false. This assumption strikes me as wrong: I contend most ordinary speakers would not have a firm view about k's truth or falsity, whereas they would regard an utterance of (K*) as definitely false-(again, this claim may be tested as suggested in fn. 6). So the Russellian needs to explain at least this disparity, as regards obvious or uncontroversial falsity, between k and its candidate Russellian paraphrases. In any case-and this is the second reason the Gricean explanation is inadequate-we can construct experimental scenarios where there is no question of misleading anyone. Suppose e.g. we are asked to say of certain sentences presented to us on a computer screen whether we take them to be true or false, or whether we feel awkward about assigning a truth value. Among the sentences presented are (K) and a sentence of the form of (K*). I venture ordinary speakers would generally say that the latter was false but that they felt awkward about (K), even though there was no question of misleading anyone here. A Gricean diagnosis of the original disparity Strawson identifies is therefore suspect.
Let us turn now to the presupposition thesis itself. One familiar issue about SPT is that there are two ways in which an utterer of a declarative sentence may fail 'to make a true or a false assertion': her utterance may express a proposition that is neither true nor false, or-the stronger reading-her utterance may simply fail to express a proposition, period. Strawson (1950) does not specify which one of these positions pertains to SPT, though the consensus seems to be that he eventually (1964) settles for the latter, stronger view (see e.g. Soames 1989, p. 562 ff. and Neale 1990, p. 26 ). We need not concern ourselves with questions of interpretation: let me state at the outset that I shall be defending the strong version of the presupposition thesis, on which no proposition is expressed when the presupposition (or, as I prefer to characterise it, precondition) is flouted.
The predominant reason SPT has been rejected is that other utterances involving the description 'the King of France' appear to be true or false uncontroversially: Arguably some of these-possibly: k1, k4, k5 and k6-do not in fact presuppose the existence of a unique King of France. But, if so, we are owed an explanation of when and why such existence is presupposed. This is a broader version of the so-called projection problem: the problem of predicting which complex sentences (utterances) inherit the presuppositions of their constituent sub-sentences (see e.g. Karttunen 1974 , Soames 1982 , and Heim 1988 . In any case, utterances -4 -
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Given the prevalence of recalcitrant examples like (K1)-(K6), the positive case for SPT rests almost entirely on the strength of our disinclination to assign a truth value to k; but this disinclination is hardly clear or robust, and is simply denied by more than a few Russellians. These facts greatly weaken the force of Strawson's case. A much better case emerges, however, once we shift our attention from empty descriptions to incomplete descriptions.
'Unintelligibility' and the 'preconditional' diagnosis
On a simplistic reading of Russell's original account of descriptions, an utterance of the form 'The F is G' where 'the F' is incomplete-i.e. where there is more than one F-is ipso facto false. But, Strawson objects, many such utterances are entirely proper and true; consider e.g. an utterance of (T) in a conversation about a particular table that has books on it:
The table is covered with books.
Modern Russellians, however, take the context in which a description sentence is uttered to furnish either an augmentation of the description(s) therein or a restriction on the domain of quantification. Thus, the content of the utterance, u, is, on this approach, specified by a sentence of the form:
(T R ) There is exactly one table that is [in] C, and it is covered with books.
u is therefore not falsified merely by the existence of more than one table in the world: the Russellian can accommodate our intuition that (T) can be uttered to make true statements.
But, there is a different sort of clash that is untouched by this strategy. Suppose (T) is uttered in a room where there are many tables, some covered with books and some not, and no particular table is more salient than others. I take it we would be puzzled. Suppose we asked the speaker which table they meant, but they replied that they had no specific table in mind. Surely, such an answer would just compound our puzzlement: we would be at a loss as to its particular truth conditions. I say 'particular' because we can of course envisage different circumstances in which an utterance of that sentence-type would be true; the intelligibility of the sentence is not in question. The claim here is that, the particular token or utterance of that sentence, call it t, would be unintelligible in the envisaged circumstances; it certainly would not be considered strictly true or strictly false. (Henceforth, when I talk of intelligibility this should be understood as a claim about utterances.)
Now suppose that sentence (T*) was uttered in the same circumstances instead:
(T*) There is exactly one table and it is covered with books.
No doubt we would be puzzled in this case too, and would remain puzzled if the speaker said they did not have a particular table in mind. However, despite our puzzlement, that utterance (t*)
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would obviously be deemed false; we may be at a loss as to why the speaker would utter such an obvious falsehood, but we would consider it strictly false nevertheless. So, t* would not be unintelligible in the way that t would be. The Russellian owes us an explanation of this disparity. For, by RTD, t would express, if not the same proposition, the same sort of proposition as t*.
Here is one explanation that won't do. (T*) does indeed express the content of t, but we are reluctant to hear the speaker as asserting this proposition precisely because it is manifestly false. As a result, the explanation goes, we end up not knowing how to interpret t-this is what the 'unintelligibility' amounts to. The trouble with this line as it stands is that it wrongly predicts that an utterance of (T*) in the same context would be unintelligible too-for, that utterance would be manifestly false too. So, the Russellian has yet to identify differences between (T) and (T*) that would account for the difference in intelligibility. The idea I wish to press is that the unintelligibility of t stems from t simply failing to express a proposition altogether. After all, such a line is fairly orthodox in the case of utterances involving names and complex demonstratives that fail to refer, where one feels similarly awkward about assigning a truth-value. This conclusion marks the beginning of a fresh case for SPT; for, once we grant that t fails to express a proposition, we commit ourselves to the view that there are preconditions for expressing a proposition with a description sentence; and we are then off on the task of determining what those preconditions are.
We can tackle another Russellian strategy along the way. The Russellian I have in mind accepts the disparity I claim between (T) and Russellian paraphrases such as (T R ), and also accepts my suggestion that the reason why t is unintelligible is that it fails to express a proposition. But, she claims to have an RTD-friendly explanation of that last fact: viz. the context in such cases fails to fix the semantic value of 'C' in (T R ):
Hence, no complete proposition of the form of (T R ) is expressed: crudely, there is a 'gap' in the propositional structure. 8 Generalising the key points in this Russellian strategy, we get the following precondition and content principles:
(PP) It is a precondition of expressing a proposition with a description sentence 'The F is G' where 'the F' is incomplete that there be a contextually determined predicate or domain, C.
(CP) When a proposition is expressed by an utterance of such a sentence, it is the proposition: there
is exactly one F that is [in] C, and it is G.
It is (CP) which makes this account a Russellian account. I am going to argue that (PP) needs to be modified, but that the necessary modifications undermine (CP) and take us towards a Strawsonian account.
First modification. The fact is, it is not merely the absence of a candidate predicate (or domain) that is responsible for t's unintelligibility. Suppose our inscrutable utterer of t elaborated on her original claim by uttering:
(T 1 ) The table in this room is covered with books.
Surely, this utterance would be just as unintelligible as t. Yet, an obvious Russellian paraphrase of (T 1 ):
(T 1R ) There is exactly one table in this room, and it is covered with books, would be intelligible (and false). The Russellian needs to explain why the utterance of (T 1 ) in the many-table scenario is unintelligible, why (T 1R ) is not heard as a correct-albeit false-reading of that utterance, and, ultimately, why it would be improper for the speaker to utter sentence (T) in that situation with the implicit intention of augmenting 'the table' with the predicate, '__ in this room'. In short, (PP) needs to be modified in such a way as to preclude (T 1R ) from being a permissible paraphrase of t, our original unintelligible utterance.
The simplest fix is to put the unintelligibility of t down to the absence of a contextually fixed predicate that applies to at most one table. Thus, (PP) becomes:
(PP 1 ) It is a precondition of expressing a proposition with a description sentence 'The F is G' where 'the F' is incomplete that there be a contextually determined predicate or domain, C, such that there is at most one F which is [in] C.
A further modification is required, however. Suppose someone utters (T) in the many-table scenario while pointing to a vacant corner in the room. This utterance would be unintelligible too. Yet, (PP 1 ) does not preclude the manifestly false (T 2R ) There is exactly one table in that corner, and it is covered with books.
from being the correct Russellian interpretation in this case. Defenders of (PP) are thereby led to posit not merely that the contextually fixed predicate applies to at most one F, but also that it applies to at least one F. In other words, they are led to endorse:
(PP 2 ) It is a precondition of expressing a proposition with a description sentence 'The F is G' where 'the F' is incomplete that there be a contextually determined predicate or domain, C, such that there is exactly one F which is [in] C.
However, now it makes little sense to continue holding the Russellian content principle, (CP)-that when a proposition is expressed, it is the proposition that there is exactly one F which is [in] C, and it is G. For, by (PP 2 ), the truth of the underlined sub-proposition is the very precondition for expressing a proposition in the first place; so why should this be part of what is asserted as -7 - We have arrived at a view that mirrors Strawson's original thesis: a sincere utterer of a description sentence, 'The F is G', presupposes that there is a unique F, but this is not part of what the speaker asserts by way of the utterance; and when the presupposition does not obtain, the utterer fails to make a assertion altogether. There are two significant differences: we have shifted from talk of speakers presupposing such-and-such to talk of such-and-such being a precondition for expressing a proposition (or making an assertion); and, secondly, we have-for the time being at any rate-restricted the claim to sentences involving incomplete descriptions, whereas Strawson's thesis was meant to apply description sentences generally.
Descriptions and Presuppositions
As we saw, however, Strawson's support for SPT was fairly weak; the underlying intuitions were not robust enough to forge a decisive case. Recall that some utterances involving 'the King of France' (cf. (K1)-(K6)) appear not to involve the corresponding presupposition, while others do but seem straightforwardly true or false regardless. The intuitions underlying (PP 2 ), by contrast, are far more solid. Consider e.g. utterances of the following cousins of (K1)-(K6) uttered in a classroom with many students, but where the speaker does not have a particular student in mind:
(S1) I am not the student.
(S2) No one had lunch with the student yesterday.
(S3) The student is the world's richest man.
(S4) The student does not exist.
(S5) Anyone who utters (S6) believes that the student is wise.
(S6) Necessarily, the student is wise.
All seem unintelligible in the same way that the utterance of (T) in the many-table scenario was. So, this new case for a 'preconditional' account based on the unintelligibility phenomenon is on surer footing than Strawson's case for SPT from empty descriptions. But, what are we to say about descriptions not covered by (PP 2 )? It is implausible that only utterances involving incomplete descriptions should be subject to preconditions. For a start, incomplete descriptions are generally incomplete only contingently; suppose (just for the sake of argument) that all elephants but one vanished off the face of the earth; surely a description sentence such as "The elephant is hungry" does not thereby go from having preconditions before the vanishings to not having those preconditions afterwards. And how are we to account for sentences involving empty descriptions such as (K1)-(K6)? Should we say that some have preconditions but not others? -On what grounds? We are nowhere near having a theory of descriptions until we fill in some of the details.
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The key to progress here, I think, rests on acknowledging two quite separate functions of descriptions.
The referring and predicative uses
Consider the following description sentences:
(1)
The greatest French soldier liked cheese.
(2) Napoleon was the greatest French soldier.
In (1) the description 'the greatest French soldier' is used to pick out an individual with the aim of ascribing a property to him or her. I call this the referring use of a description. In (2), however, the description can be heard as specifying a property that is being ascribed to Napoleon: the property of being greatest French soldier; the determiner 'the' simply serves to indicate that the property in question is supposedly possessed by at most one individual. I call this the predicative use of a description. I do not deny that there is a reading of (2) on which it affirms that Napoleon and the greatest French soldier are one and the same individual; I do not deny, that is, that the description could be used as a referring expression by an utterer of (2). My claim is that it could be used predicatively instead: (2) is semantically ambiguous.
This distinction should not be confused with Donnellan's (1966) much discussed referentialattributive distinction; both referential and attributive uses count as referring uses in my sense.
The description in (1), for example, is being used 'referringly', but not necessarily referentially: the speaker need not already have an individual in mind whom she intended the audience to latch onto by her use of the description. Obviously, given this take on referring, I must deny some familiar theses-e.g. (a) that one must already be acquainted (in some sense) with an object in order to refer to it; and also (b) that one cannot understand an utterance involving reference without knowing which object is being referred to. But I think these denials are independently warranted in any case. Consider the following attitude report:
(3) Jones wants Smith's murderer caught.
where the embedded description is not being used referentially. Russellians do not have a plausible reading of (3) available to them. For example, (3 1 ) and (3 2 ) won't do:
(3 1 ) Exactly one person, x, murdered Smith, and Jones wants x caught.
(3 2 ) Jones wants it to be the case that exactly one person, x, murdered Smith, and that x is caught.
(3 1 ) is incorrect because it ascribes a de re want to Jones, even though she is not acquainted with the murderer; moreover, it fails to capture the fact that the description specifies part of the content of Jones' desire. (3 2 ) is incorrect because it wrongly takes Jones to want Smith dead. The most plausible reading of (3), it strikes me, takes the description to be referring to an individual attributively, i.e. by way of the descriptive content, contrary to the acquaintance and 'knowing which' requirements in theses (a) and (b) above.
One might still wonder what is to be gained from distinguishing between referring and predicative uses. The referential reading of an utterance is alleged by some to differ in truth -9 -
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value from the attributive reading-so, that distinction is at least putatively of semantic import. But, on the supposition that that there can be at most one greatest French soldier, the referring and predicative readings of (2) cannot differ in truth value. So, it might be thought that, all else being equal, a unitary account of descriptions, that treats descriptions in referring and predicative positions alike-as RTD does-is preferable to one that posits ambiguities. 9 However, all else is not equal: descriptions do not always lend themselves to a predicative reading: there are, we shall see, preconditions for the predicative use, and these are not the same as the preconditions for the referring use. So, while the referring and predicative readings will not differ in truth value when both readings are permissible, there are cases when only one interpretation is available.
Suppose we are in a classroom with many students, including mature ones, and some members of staff; an individual is introduced to us as 'Anne', and the speaker utters (4a):
(4a) Anne is a student.
We may not know the truth value of the utterance, but it would be perfectly intelligible: there is no question of our not understanding it. By contrast, an utterance of (4b) in the same context: (4b) Anne is the student.
would surely be unintelligible in our sense. Now consider utterances of (4c) and (4d) in that situation:
(4c) Anne is the only student.
(4d) Anne is the brightest student.
Of course, we will be puzzled as to why someone should utter (4c) here, but presumably the utterance will be deemed strictly false. (4d) is like (4a) in that although we may not know the truth value of the utterance, we fully expect it to have one-it will be true or false depending on whether or not Anne is brighter than every other (relevant) student. The Russellian favouring a unitary account has to explain this disparity in intelligibility between (4b) on the one hand and (4c) and (4d) on the other; the problem is pressing, for according to them, the utterances of (4b) and (4c) should express one and the same proposition.
My diagnosis of this disparity is that no proposition is expressed in the case of (4b) because neither the referring nor the predicative readings are available, whereas the predicative reading is available for (4c) and (4d). As a first stab, I suggest that a description, 'the F', can be used predicatively in a certain context if, and only if: if something were (an) F, or had the property of being (an) F, in such circumstances, it would be the only one. Clearly, 'the student' does not meet this condition in our classroom scenario: the conditional is immediately falsified by the presence of many students in the vicinity of the utterance. By contrast, if someone had the property of being sole (or brightest) student in the circumstances, they would be the only one; thus, 'the only student' and 'the brightest student' can, on this proposal, be used predicatively.
Some descriptions, e.g. 'the smallest table', 'the highest paid academic' and 'the last man on the moon', are logically (or semantically) guaranteed to meet the above condition, but other descriptions may meet it in virtue of contingent factors. For example, a company might be small enough to warrant one, but only one, telephonist. In that context, 'the telephonist' meets the above condition for predicative use; thus, one might say, truly or falsely, "I would like to be the telephonist". But, an utterance of that sentence in a call centre, for example, would clearly be infelicitous-unless, that is, we build more into the background circumstances so as to fulfil the referring or predicative preconditions. If I am right, then, it is a necessary condition of expressing a proposition with a description sentence, whether the description is being used referringly or predicatively, that there be at most one contextually relevant F. But, whereas the referring use further requires that there be a contextually relevant F, the predicative use does not. Take (K1) for instance: (K1) I am not the King of France.
A present-day utterance of this sentence would be true, even though there is no King of France. I contend this is because the description meets the predicative-preconditions and is heard predicatively. The referring-use does not yield a proposition in this case.
The account needs tweaking, however. Suppose I utter (E) when we are in a small room, pointing to a cat as I use the demonstrative 'that':
That is the large elephant.
This utterance would be unintelligible, yet according to the present proposal, the predicative reading is available, so the utterance should be heard as false. For, if there were a large elephant in this room, there could only be one! This suggests a further precondition for the predicative use: 'the F' can be used as a predicate only if it is not unreasonable to expect there to be an F in the first place. We can capture this idea with the following conditional: had things been slightly different, there might have been an F (in the circumstances).
We are now in a position to consider a more comprehensive Strawsonian preconditional theory (SPT*). First, here are rough specifications of the preconditions for referring and predicative uses of descriptions:
Preconditions for the Referring Use: An utterance involving the referring use of a description, 'the F', will express a proposition if and only if there is a contextually-determined predicate (domain) that applies to (contains) exactly one F, i.e. if and only if there is exactly one contextually relevant F.
SPT PRED . Preconditions for the Predicative Use:
An utterance involving the predicative use of a description, 'the F' will express a proposition if and only if the following conditional holds: Had things been slightly different, there might have been an F (in the circumstances), but no more than one.
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Next, the question of what is asserted when the appropriate precondition is met. I suggested earlier that we should not take what is a precondition for expressing a proposition to also be part of what is asserted. Nevertheless, we do need to take preconditions into account in order to explain the correctness of inferences. For example, a sincere utterer of 'The F is G' thereby commits herself to the truth of 'an F is G'. We can explain this commitment on the present approach only if the preconditions relevant to the first utterance are acknowledged. So, I suggest that in representing the content of an utterance at the level of logical form, one should represent both asserted and unasserted content, the latter being the precondition that has to be met. This can be achieved quite simply by bracketing. For example, the inferentially-relevant content of an utterance, 'The F is G', may be represented in logical form as follows:
(Ref1) {(∃x)(y)(F c y ↔ x=y)}Gx
The sentence within the curly brackets signifies the unasserted precondition-in this case, the precondition for the referring use-the subscript 'C' signifies the contextual restriction on F; the underlining of 'x' outside the curly brackets is intended to remind us that it should not be thought of simply as a bound variable, but as a referring expression that refers to whatever object, if any, that (uniquely) satisfies the bracketed condition. More generally, the content of an utterance, S(the F), involving the referring use of 'the F' is:
The content of an utterance, 'a is the F', involving the predicative use of 'the F' may be specified in something like the following way:
The sentence within the curly brackets is intended to capture the idea that there might have been an F in the circumstances, but no more than one.
The foregoing remarks are intended only as a sketch of how one might develop a preconditional theory on the basis of the unintelligibility phenomenon. But, I think we have enough of an idea of the approach to see its comparative merits over RTD.
SPT* vs. RTD
To begin with, SPT* accommodates, even if it doesn't genuinely explain, the unintelligibility cases. Russellians have no obvious response-other than simply to deny that the utterances in question are unintelligible.
Secondly, and just as important, SPT* takes descriptions to have a referring use, unlike RTD. As we have seen, it is not just the unintelligibility phenomenon that signals a referring use: a second consideration is the interpretation of attitude reports like
Jones wants Smith's murderer caught.
We seem obliged to treat the description as a referring expression rather than a quantifier in such cases. to communicate that a particular table is broken. There is no tension whatsoever in this case: the utterance seems entirely kosher. The absence of tension tells against RTD and in favour of the view that descriptions are proper devices for expressing object-dependent propositions.
10
A third merit of SPT* is that it recognizes predicative uses of descriptions as distinct from referring uses. We have seen that this allows for an explanation for the disparity between (4b) and (4c): (4b) Anne is the student.
Russellians face a special difficulty here, because they take (4b) and (4c) to be necessarily (and a priori) equivalent, regardless of the context. Attitude reports provide further support for a predicative use: the predicative reading of (7) I want to be the Head of Department.
is surely the only feasible one: I am expressing a desire to occupy a certain role, not a desire to be identical with a particular individual.
Current score: (at least) 3-nil to SPT*. However, there are numerous phenomena that Rusellians take to support a quantificational analysis. We will consider some of these shortly. We have seen that SPT* sanctions the predicative reading of (K1), so it comes out literally true. SPT* also allows explanations of our truth-value intuitions in the other cases, though not necessarily at the level of literal content. In the case of (K2), for example, since 'x had lunch with y' is a binary relation, only the referring use of 'the King of France' could be strictly correct; according to SPT*, then, no proposition is expressed here. However, since the predicative precondition is met, one may maintain that in the absence of a literal reading, we hear the utterer as affirming, as intending to communicate, something like (K2*) No one had lunch with someone who is the King of France.
Thus, the original utterance is not literally true, but a true proposition is communicated. I emphasise, this is possible only because 'the King of France' meets the predicative precondition. So, e.g. (S2) cannot be heard as communicating (S2*) in the classroom scenario:
(S2) No one had lunch with the student.
(S2*) No one had lunch with anyone who is the student.
(K4) should be treated in the same way as (K2): an utterance now of (K4) would not be literally true, but a true proposition, that no one is the King of France, would be communicated.
I won't go through the other examples, but it should be clear to the reader how an advocate of SPT* might be able to explain our truth-value intuitions in the other cases just as well as RTD.
What of Strawson's original sentence:
The King of France is wise?
Again, the verdict must be that it strictly fails to express a proposition. However, the earlier remarks concerning (K2) and (K4) predict that we should hear a predicative reading, e.g. that someone is the King of France and wise. Why, then, are we disinclined to proclaim the utterance false? I have no answer at present. This is a indeed a shortcoming of SPT*. But the crucial point is that RTD and Strawson's original presupposition thesis are in the same boat. None of these theories satisfactorily accounts for the disparity between (K) and the other (K)-sentences. So, RTD does not score any points over SPT* as far as the (K)-sentences are concerned.
Finally, let us consider three central points Russellians take to tell in favour of a quantificational account over any account that treats descriptions as referring expressions. We will see that recognizing the predicative use of descriptions provides outs for SPT*-supporters in these cases.
The first point concerns existential statements. If descriptions were referring expressions, utterances of the form 'The F exists' and 'The F does not exist' should be trivially true or nonsensical. RTD delivers readings of such utterances that does not render them non-trivially true or false. But we have already seen that SPT* can also accommodate our intuitions here by way of the predicative readings of the utterances-recall the line on (K4). The only difference is that SPT* does the accommodating at the level of communicated content whereas RTD claims to do so at the level of literal content.
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Descriptions and Presuppositions
SPT*-supporters have their own complaint against RTD, however: namely, that the Russellian explanation, as it stands, cannot be the whole story, because we should in that case be able to hear true and false readings of (T◊) in the many- In other words, the charge here is that in the absence of a Russellian explanation of the unintelligibility phenomenon, their explanation of the two readings of (9) is suspect.
The current state of play has SPT* winning comfortably against RTD. Of course, I have not been able to consider all the issues Russellians might press, and there are bound to be questions of detail and problem-cases for SPT* that need addressing. But I hope to have at least given the Strawsonian preconditional approach a fresh boost. We can no longer think of there being a resolute stand-off between the two camps: the ball is firmly in the Russellians' court.
But there is perhaps less of a division between Russell's own position and Strawson's than has been portrayed in the literature. The view we have arrived at, SPT*, certainly goes against modern Russellian accounts of descriptions (such as Neale's (1990) ), insofar as they attempt to uphold a quantificational component at the level of what is asserted. But, on comparing the respective logical forms of the two approaches, we see that there is no difference of metaphysical importance: Russell's goal of ontological parsimony is respected. The departure from RTD concerns what is asserted, and, consequently, literal truth-conditions; but for all that has been said, there is complete agreement as far as the underlying metaphyisics is concernedcomplete agreement as to what 'states-of-affairs' utterances of description sentences commit one to. So, I leave you with the suggestion that Russell (1959) should not have taken umbrage at Strawson's (1950) criticims of his theory: they were basically in agreement.
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